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In the SupreiDe Court
of the State of Utah

MILTON WINN,
Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8575

WILLIAM B. REID,
Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge, District Court of Cache County,
Utah. The action was for personal injuries and damages
to personality. The court sat without a jury.
The appellant and respondent were both traveling
in the nighttime in the same direction, the appellant on
horseback and the respondent by automobile. The appellant's horse was struck from behind by the respondent's
automobile while re.spondent was riding along the left
edge of the road in a northerly direction, facing traffic.
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In finding for the respondent, the court held appellant should have been traveling on the right side of the
roadway, that he was negligent as a matter of law in
riding along the left side of the highway and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of his damages. (R.
6, 7)
The appellant was plaintiff and the respondent the
defendant in the court below. They will be referred to
as plaintiff and defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The accident happened on June 21, 1954, within the
limits of Smithfield, Cache County, Utah, between 1st
North and Center Streets on 3rd West Street, in the
nighttime at about 8 o'clock P.:M:. (R.-13, 14). Plaintiff
was riding a horse and defendant driving an automobile.
Both were traveling North in the same direction on 3rd
West Street in the town of Smithfield. The street had
an oil surface 20 ft. wide with shoulders 4 to 6 ft. on
each side (R.-13, 14, 16, 24, 36). The plaintiff, on turning
on to 3rd West Street, traveled along the \Vest edge
of the oil surface or on the shoulder in a northerly direction for a distance of about 30 rods when he was struck
from behind by an .aut01nobile driven by defendant (R.
11, 16-18, 24, 36, 39-43). The defendant applied his brakes
and skidded approximately 48 ft. prior to the impact.
The skid n1arks started about the center of the oil surface and veered to the \Vest so that the left wheels were
a foot or two east of the edge of the oil surface at the
point of impact (R. 39-45). The left side of the car
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was damaged (R. 26, 35-36). Defendant's lights were on
and there was nothing to obstruct his view and he gave
no warning of his approach (R. 17, 40). The horse was
thrown into the bar pit on the West. Its left leg was
broken and plaintiff ,sustained a broken foot and was
otherwise injured (R. 17-20).
From the foregoing facts, the court found the following:
"That on the 21st day of June, 1955, within
the corporate limits of Smithfield, Cache County,
Utah, the plaintiff was riding horseback and at
the same time the defendant was operating his
car on the left hand side of the same road, both
parties proceeding in the s-ame direction.
"That as the parties moved northward in the
same direction, the plaintiff caused his horse to
move from the right hand side of the road to the
left hand side of the road and had .straightened
out and proceeded parallel with the road for about
30 rods when the accident occurred. That the defendant operated his car into and against the rear
end of the horse, then, there and thereby injuring
said horse and the plaintiff himself. That the
vehicle was also damaged.
"The Court finds that the plaintiff was negligent and that said negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury and damage by reason
of the fact that the plaintiff directed his animal
over to the wrong side of the road and along said
side without just cause or excuse and that no
signal or warning was given by the plaintiff to
the defendant as he approached from the plaintiff's rear; that the defendant was negligent and
such negligence was a proximate cause of the
accident by reason of the fact that the said defendant was then and there operating, without
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just cause and excuse, his vehicle on the left side
of the road. The court further finds that the
accident occurred in the nighttime .and while the
defendant had his head lights burning and that
no light was displayed by the plaintiff (R. 6, 7).

POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT
WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN TRAVELING
ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROADWAY IN THE FACE
OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED, IF IT FOUND AS A MATTER OF
FACT, THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN TRAVELING HORSEBACK ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROADWAY IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN TRAVEUNG ON THE LEFT
SIDE OF THE ROADWAY, THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE
WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
AND DAMAGE.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
The plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law
in traveling on horseback on the left hand side of the
road in the face of oncoming traffic.
The court's findings of fact indicates the court was
of the opinion and it so held that it was the duty of a
horseman, in the nighttime, to travel on the right hand
side of the road, his back to traffic, as a matter of law,
and that in traveling on the left edge of the roadway
in the face of oncoming traffic he was negligent as a
matter of law, for in its findings it said:
"The court finds that the plaintiff was negligent and that said negligence w.as a proximate
cau.se of plaintiff's injuries and damage by reason
of the fact that the plaintiff directed his animal
over to the wrong side of the road and along
said side without just cause .and excuse."
Apparently the court was under a misapprehension
as to the correct rule of law in this respect and that
accounts for the result reached.
The common law did not impose a requirement that
the rider of a horse travel on the right side of the road,
especially in the nighttime, .and if there is such a requirement it would have to be imposed by statute.
A horseman's and motorist's rights upon the highway are equal and reciprocal each being restricted in
the exercise of his rights by the corresponding rights
of the other, and the rider of a well broken horse is
entitled to ride it anywhere on the street that he chooses
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in the ab.sence of statute. It has been stated by .a learned
author as follows:
"The rights of a driver of a horse and the
driver of a motor vehicle to use the highway are
equal and reciprocal, each being restricted in the
exercise of his rights by the current rights of
the other. Accordingly, the driver of a well broken
horse is entitled to drive it anywhere in the street
he may choose, and, when he sees an automobile
approaching it, it is not negligence to drive close
to the curb he may choose . . . " Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and Practice, Blashfield 3 permanent Edition, page 48, Section 1672. And see
Elliott on Roads and Streets, Section 834.
We have been unable to find where any courts have
laid down a rule that a horsen1an must travel on the
right facing traffic or a 1natter of law and the statutes
of this State do not. Our statutes are silent on the matter,
merely saying:
"Every person riding an animal or driving
any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall
be subject to the provisions of the Act applicable
to the driver of a vehicle, except those provisions
of the Act which by their nature can have no application." 41-6-15, F.C.A. 1953.
The only vehicles the statutes enjoin to travel on
the right side of the road are those that can be equipped
with rear-end warning lights and reflectors, such .as bicycles, automobiles, tractors, etc. (41-6-90, 41-6-117 to -!16-175, U.C.A. 1953) and as a horseman cannot as a
practical matter be equipped with either tail lights or
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reflectors, it would be illogical to say that the statutes
requiring vehicles to travel on the right side of the road
in the nighttime are applicable to him.
As the court was under a misunderstanding, believing that .a horseinan was required as a matter of law
to travel on the right side of the road with his back to
traffic, it undoubtedly misapplied the law and reached
the result it would not have done if it had correctly
understood the correct rule, and for this reason the
plaintiff is entitled to a new trial unless the court
should hold the plaintiff was riding on the proper side
of the road, not negligent, or if negligent, it was not a
proximate cause of his injuries, in which event we submit
that it should direct the trial court to enter judgment
for the plaintiff. This latter position, we believe, is the
one the court should take.
Walker vs. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2nd) 291,
3 Utah (2d) 54.

Point II
In riding on the left side of the road plaintiff was
on the proper side of the road and not negligent.
As we have pointed out, our statutes are silent as
to which side of the road .a horseman should travel,
especially while traveling in the nighttime; thus the rule
of equal rights applies. Under this rule, nighttime or
daytime, as long as he surrenders one-half of the road,
either left or right, to the driver of an automobile, he is
not negligent.
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"Under the rule that a horse1nan's and a
rnotorist's rights upon the highway are equal, the
rider of .a horse who is approached from the rear
by a motorist has a right to continue to use at
least one-half of the beaten track, and, if he surrenders the right ~ide of the beaten track for the
use of the motorist, that is all that he is required
to do. The fact that the parties are going in the
same direction instead of in opposite directions
imposes no greater obligation upon the horseback
rider to leave the beaten track, is not guilty of
contributory negligence by traveling on the left
side of such beaten track." (Italics added.)
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice;
Blashfield 3 Permanent Edition, page 50, Sec.
1672;

Traeger vs. Wasson, 163 ill. App. 572.
A horse1nan has as n1uch right to the use of the
roadways as any other traveler, and this court has held
that as it is ilnpossible to equip a horse with taillights
it is not necessary for hiln to do so. This court in Dalley
vs. Mid- Western Dairy Products Company, 80 rtah 331,
15 Pac. (2nd) 309, said:
•· ... He knew he was traveling upon a highway that was used by pedestrians, and persons
traveling on horseback and in horse-drawn -rehicles, none of whon1 are required to disclose a
light to warn others of their pre.sence upon the
highway."
~hould thi~

<'ourt, hmn'Yer. not be inclined to follow
thP doctrine of equal right~. preferring the reasonable,
prudent mnn tP~t. we neYPrthele~~ urge that the plaintiff,
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in riding on the left in the face of oncoming traffic, waH
not negligent and that as to this the minds of reasonable
men cannot differ, and if this be true, the court should
direct the trial court to enter judginent in favor of the
plaintiff and fix the amount of judgment.
Walker vs. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2nd) 291, 3
Utah (2nd) 54, supra;
Continental Bank and Trust Company vs.
Stewart, 291 Pac. (2nd) 890, 4 Utah (2nd)
228.
Where else should the plaintiff have been riding
in the nighttiine? To hold that .a reasonable, prudent person would ride on the right in the front of traffic is
to say that such a person would deliberately expose himself to danger, for a rider on the right encounters more
danger from the rear than frmn the front and a horseman on the left encounters nwre danger from the front
than frmn the rear, and facing the danger to the front
he is in a position to take steps to protect himself and
to avoid colliding with users of the road.

Kessel vs. Hunt, 244 N.W. 714;
Pixler vs. C.lemuns, 191 NW 375.
There is an analogy between a pedestrian .and a
horseman using the highway. The statute requires a
pedestrian to~ whenever practical, walk on the left in the
face of oncoming traffic. ( 41-6-82, U .C .A. 1953). Why
should this not be the rule as to a horseman? The same
re.ason:-; are present, nmnely that as neither can, as a
practical matter, be equipped with warning lights andreflectors, he is in less danger in facing oncoming traffic

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
on the left than he would be in having traffic approach
him from the rear on the right, and while on the left
he is in a position to see approaching traffic and take
steps to prevent colliding with oncoming traffic.
In the light of the court's finding that plaintiff had
"moved frorn the right side of the road to the left side
of the road and had straightened out and proceeded
parallel with the road for about 30 rods before the
accident occurred," we urge that he was not only traveling
on the proper side and not negligent and that as to this
the minds of reasonable men cannot differ.
In the event this Court believes under its common
law making powers that it should lay down a rule regarding where a horseman should travel in the nighttime
whenever practicable, neither adopting the equal rights
doctrine or the reasonable man test, for the guidance of
travelers, we submit that under the present traffic conditions that logic and common sense would require that
it adopt the rule the legislature has adopted pertaining
to pedestrians, namely that whenever practicable he shall
travel on the left .side of the road.

Point III
Assuming plaintiff was negligent, ne1.:ertheless suclz
negligence wa.s not a proximate cause of his injuries.
The eourt having found that plaintiff had traveled
parallel approxi1nately 30 rods on the left side of the
street when struck from the rear by defendant's autoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mobile, it is our position that plaintiff's riding on the
left side of the road could not be a proximate cause of his
injuries, the sole cause being defendant's negligence.
It is well settled that for plaintiff's negligence to
bar recovery, it must be a proximate cause of his injuries
and that the sa1ne rules apply in determining the proximate cause in contributory negligence as in the negligence of the defendant. Devine vs. Cook, 279 Pac. (2nd)
1073, 3 Utah (2nd) 134.

The most widely used definition of proximate c.ause
lS:

"The proximate c.ause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred.''
38 Am. Jur. page 695, Sec. 50.
And thi.s court has said that causes which are merely
incidental to a superior or controlling agency are not
efficient causes or proximate causes.
"The proximate cause is the efficient cause,
the one that necessarily sets the other causes in
operation. The causes that are merely instrument.al to a superior or controlling agency are not
the proximate cause and the responsible one."
Edgar vs. Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 32 Utah 330, 90 Pac. 475.
There must not only be an efficient cause but negligence which furnishes the condition or an occasion upon
which the injuries .are received is not a proximate cause.
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"Negligence which merely furnishes the condition or occasion upon which injuries are received but does not put in motion the agency by
which the injuries are inflicted is not the proximate cause thereof."
38 Am. Jur. Sec. 54, page 702;
Chatterton vs. Pocate.llo Post, 223 P.ac. (2nd)
389.
And the injuries must have been reasonably foreseen
or anticipated for an act of negligence to be a proximate
cause.
" ... It is generally held that in order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not
amounting to a wanton wrong, is the proximate
cause of the injury, it must appear that the injury
was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence or wrongful act and that it ought to
have been foreseen in the light of attending circumstances."
Edgar vs. Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 32 Utah 330, 90 Pac. 745, Supra.
And Judge Sanborn of the 8th Circuit in a well
reasoned case said :
"An injury that is a natural and probable
consequence of an act of negligence is actionable,
and such an art is the proximate cause of the injury. But an injury which could not have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable
result of an act of negligence is not the proximate
cause of it."
Shellaberger vs. Fisher . 143 Fed. 937.
From the eourt's finding, although it did not specifically f'ay, it is apparent that the defendant was negli-

1

1
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gent in at least three particulars: (1) Failure to keep
a proper lookout, (2) failure to keep his car under proper
control, and ( 3) driving on the wrong side of the road.
(-l:l-6-53, F.C.A. 1953). As to the latter the court found:
"That the said defendant was then and there
operating, without ju.st cause or excuse, his vehicle
on the left side of the road" (R-6).
These acts were the sole cause of plaintiff's injuries.
The plaintiff's negligence, if any, on being on the
left side of the ro.ad was at most a remote cause. By
being there he 1nerely furnished the condition or occasion
upon which the defendant's act of negligence acted.
Had the defendant kept a proper lookout, his car under
control, and had he driven on the right side of the road
there would have been no collision.
Plaintiff being on the left side of the road did not
put in motion the agency which inflicted the injury for
that agency w.as the defendant. In every respect the
efficient cause was the acts of the defendant. The defendant directed the force, the agency that caused the
damage. Had he not released this force, there would
have been no injury. How could the plaintiff, traveling
in the same direction .and being struck from behind, be a
controlling agency~ How could he have put in motion
an agency hy which his injuries were inflicted~ The
plaintiff being there merely furnished the condition or
occasion to be acted upon.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Chatterton vs. Pocatello Post, supra, said:
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". . . that negligence which merely furnishes
the condition or occasion upon which injuries
are received but does not put in motion the agency
by which the injury is inflicted is not the proximate cause thereof."
And in applying the final test of whether or not
the plaintiff could reasonably foresee that his negligence,
if any, would result in injury, we ask how could he have
reasonably anticipated that he would have been struck
by an automobile while he was traveling on the left side
of the road either from the front or from behind?
Would it not be reasonably anticipated that as to vehicles
coming from the front and on their proper side of the
road, he could see them and act for his safety and that
as to vehicles coming from the rear they would travel
on the right hand side of the road, as enjoined by
statute?
The plaintiff would no more anticipate the approach
of an automobile from behind on the side of the street
which the autonwbile was not expected to use than would
a pedestrian. And if this court should say that a pedestrian should anticipate that injuries would result from
an .auton1obile striking from behind while walking on the
left side of the road facing oncoming traffic, then a
pedestrian would not be free of negligence and his negligence would be a proxhnate cause of his injuries, notwithstanding that he was enjoined by statute to walk on the
left side of the road facing oncmning traffic.
We .agree that ordinarily the question of proximate
cause is a 1natter of fact for the detennination of the
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jury or the court, as the case may be. However, when~
reasonable minds cannot differ, then it becomes a matter
of law for this court to determine, and should it determine
as a n1atter of law that plaintiff's negligence, if any, did
not contribute to the collision, then the trial court should
be directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and fix the damages.

Walker vs. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2nd) 291, 3
Utah (2nd) 54.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, plaintiff submits :
(1) That a horseman is not required, as a matter of

law, to travel in the nightime on the right side of a roadway.
(2) That the plaintiff was not negligent in riding on
the left hand side of the road, for under the doctrine
of equal rights he had an equal right to use the road with
the defendant and that when he chose to use the left hand
side of the road, leaving the right side clear for the
defendant, he was within his rights, and as to this the
minds of reasonable men cannot differ.
(3) That in any event, a reasonable and prudent
man under like conditions would have ridden where he
did, and as to this the minds of reasonable men cannot
differ.
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(4) That his negligence, if any, could not have been a
proximate cause of his injuries, and as to this the minds
of reasonable men cannot differ.
That this court should direct the trial court to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, fixing the damages, or in the alternate, direct
a new trial inasmuch as the trial court was under a
misunderstanding in believing that plaintiff was required,
as a matter of law, to travel on the right side of the road.
Respectfully submitted,
NEWEL G. DAINES
Logan, Utah
L. DELOS DAINES
Salt Lake City, Utah
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